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Central Asia Policy after the 
Russian-Georgian War
Russia and Central Asia after the Georgia war
At first glance, the situation appears clear-cut: Russia 
wanted to utilize the Georgia war as an opportunity to 
expand its influence in Central Asia. Moscow is seek-
ing to strengthen its military presence in the region and 
to curtail the influence of  other actors in Central Asia. 
Since the collapse of  the Soviet Union the Central 
Asian states have more or less accepted Russia’s hege-
monic claims, largely because they lack alternatives. So 
far, the USA and particularly the EU have lacked both 
the means and the desire to bring their security policy 
and economic interests to bear in Central Asia. How-
ever, the Russian leadership underestimated the degree 
to which the Central Asian states regard Russia’s role 
in the region as having changed. Before the Georgia 
war, Russia was the most important intermediary in re-
gional conflicts. Since Russia’s unilateral recognition of  
the two Georgian provinces, the Central Asian states 
no longer accept Russia as a referee. The fear that Rus-
sia could use border conflicts in the region for its own 
interests and exert pressure on the countries there has 
aroused concern among Central Asian elites.
In recent years, Russia has enjoyed some success in re-
alizing closer security policy ties with the Central Asian 
states through new multilateral structures. Alongside 
the Shanghai Organization for Cooperation (SOC), 
Russia is mainly attempting to exert influence in the re-
gion through the Collective Security Treaty Organiza-
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tion (CSTO). Although Russia and China are attempt-
ing to work together within the SOC to balance their 
influence in Central Asia, Moscow plays a dominant 
role within the CSTO. In early 2009 the members of  
the CSTO (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) agreed to establish 
a rapid response force to deal with crisis situations. 
Their goal is to respond jointly to security risks such 
as international terrorism, cross-border criminality and 
the drug trade. In the process, the participating states 
regard Afghanistan, which shares a border with Tajiki-
stan and Uzbekistan, as the primary security challenge.
The ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia
For Aleksei Malashenko, the CSTO is primarily an 
instrument designed to keep the Central Asian states 
under control. Thus Russian companies provide 
weapons to these states at low domestic Russian prices, 
which means that Moscow is indirectly subsidizing 
these countries. At the same time, the military orga-
nization serves to stabilize the authoritarian regimes 
in Central Asia. Malashenko assumes that Russia has 
a certain interest in maintaining a relative presence of  
the Taliban in Afghanistan. In this way, it can justify its 
military bases in Central Asia and the expansion of  the 
CSTO. This then enhances Russia’s significance in the 
region for all Central Asian states, since the impres-
sion is maintained that the true danger is coming from 
the south. Since the end of  last year, Russia has been 
buying natural gas from the Central Asian countries 
at world market prices. Gazprom then transports the 
purchased gas as ‘Russian’ gas through its own transit 
pipelines to the West. Moscow wants to prevent the 
Central Asian states from selling their gas to the West 
without going through Russia, since in this case Rus-
sia’s pipeline monopoly would be threatened and the 
states in the region would become more independent. 
Moscow wishes to keep all energy exports from the 
territory of  the former Soviet Union under its control.
In the international arena, Central Asia is primarily 
regarded as being at the mercy of  geopolitical interests. 
At issue here are both security issues and the pro-
duction and transport of  raw materials. The current 
conflict over the closing of  Manas Air Force Base in 
Kyrgyzstan reveals the means by which funds and in-
fluence are being fought over in Central Asia: the one 
who pays the most makes the deal. In this case, Mos-
cow paid more than the Americans. Thus the Kyrgyz-
stan president Kurmanbek Bakiyev called on the USA 
to close the base. While the Central Asian leaders enjoy 
certain advantages in this ‘Great Game’, there is a lack 
of  outside pressure which is needed to implement im-
portant political and economic reforms. The authori-
tarian regimes are being courted and thus are stabilized. 
Russia’s objective is to weaken American influence in 
the region and to permanently secure its own role as 
a regional power. By contrast, the Central Asian states 
are interested in maintaining good relations with both 
Russia and the EU and US. They are not interested in 
having a single dominant actor in the region.
China
However, the West and Russia must anticipate an 
increase in Chinese influence across Central Asia over 
the coming years. Beijing is pursuing the long-term 
goal of  becoming the most important actor in the 
region. Unlike Russia, which is primarily basing its 
strategy on the development of  military cooperation 
with the Central Asian states, China is concentrating 
on economic cooperation. For China, Central Asia’s 
raw materials are of  supreme interest. The only threat 
to Chinese policy in the region derives from Islam, 
which Beijing is seeking to combat with all the means 
at its disposal.
EU and OSCE
For Germany and the EU, Russia is the key actor in 
Central Asia since Moscow has a monopoly on energy 
transports from Central Asia to Europe. The EU is in-
terested in a dialogue between Russia and Central Asia 
and will promote joint large-scale projects in the future. 
From the EU’s perspective, the central challenges for 
the region are combating terrorism and the drug trade 
DGAPaktuell 2009/2 
Central Asia Policy after the 
Russian-Georgian War
as well as the development of  more secure supply 
structures for natural resources such as water. Uzbeki-
stan, for example, does not provide any gas to Tajiki-
stan because Dushanbe does not supply Uzbekistan 
with the water resources it needs. In dealing with these 
issues, the OSCE plays an important role in the region 
alongside the EU. While many Western states have 
criticized the assumption of  the OSCE chairmanship 
by Kazakhstan in 2010, this could nevertheless raise 
international awareness of  Central Asia and promote 
cooperation among the Central Asian States. Although 
Kazakhstan is still a long way away from the standards 
of  Western democracy, it is regarded as a stabiliz-
ing force in the entire region since, in comparison to 
the other Central Asian states, it has been relatively 
successful in adjusting to market-based structures in 
recent years.
The Central Asia strategy that Germany’s EU Coun-
cil Presidency launched in the first half  of  2007 has 
intensified Europe’s relations to the region. While 
the economic exchange has grown with the countries 
in the region, so far there have been few concrete 
improvements in direct cooperation. Because of  the 
undemocratic political structures and the tradition-
ally high level of  corruption, only a few European 
firms are prepared to invest in the Central Asian states 
– aside from Kazakhstan. The trade volume between 
the EU and Kazakhstan in the past year amounted to 
400 million Euros. The exchange of  goods is signifi-
cantly lower with all the other Central Asian states.
A lack of ‘good governance’
One problem that the autocratic leaders in Central 
Asia have experienced has been a lack of  success in 
improving living standards. At the same time, the pre-
vious leaders had no interest in developing democratic 
and civil society structures which in turn could give 
rise to new political elites. The inability to carry out 
internal reforms is leading to a situation where – with 
the exception of  Kazakhstan – the younger genera-
tion is abandoning these countries. It will be important 
for Russia to influence the renewal of  elites in Central 
Asia over the coming years. The future political elite 
could be supplied by three sources: the autocratic 
power apparatus, modernizers from the economic elite 
as well as traditionalists who are affected by moderate 
Islam. Russia’s problem is that it has not been concern-
ing itself  with its own Russian lobby in these countries. 
No influential Central Asian politician is prepared to 
represent Russian interests. One side effect of  this “de-
russification” is that in only a few years English may 
replace Russia as the lingua franca in Central Asia.
Job migration is an important issue in relations be-
tween Russia and the Central Asian states. Central 
Asian seasonal workers provide a major contribution 
to the economies of  their home countries. This is why 
there are fears that Russia could use these migrants as 
pawns in its negotiations with the Central Asian states. 
If, for example, Russia were to send the six million Uz-
beks currently working in Russia back home, Tashkent 
would have an enormous problem that could spiral out 
of  its control. This problem could become virulent if  
the negative impact of  the financial crisis on Russia 
intensifies.
Energy cooperation
Particularly since the gas dispute around New Year’s 
2008/09, the EU has displayed growing interest in 
closer cooperation with the Central Asian states in the 
field of  energy. However, the states of  the region are 
sending largely negative signals: the Kazakh leadership 
has no interest in the Trans-Caspian Pipeline and the 
Turkmen president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow 
has likewise made negative statements about Nabucco. 
One reason for this skeptical attitude is that for many 
years the EU states have failed to show their clear 
backing for this project: the EU must now make it 
clear that it really will construct the Nabucco pipeline 
and that it has a direct interest in doing business with 
the Central Asian states. This would also encourage 
the other Central Asian states to support this project. 
The Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute has increased the 
EU’s willingness to built Nabucco. However, the prob-
lem remains that Nabucco can only operate profitably 
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if  additional supply sources can be developed, par-
ticularly in Iran. In addition, all the neighboring states 
must clarify the legal status of  the Caspian Sea before 
pipelines can be laid across the seabed.
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